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JAMES 
YELP, 
FILED 
SU8srior Court of California 
ounty of Los Angeles 
NOV 13 2013 
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
DEMETRIADES, Case No.: BC484055 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RULINGSIORDERS 
INC. , 
Defendant. 
Defendant's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs is GRANTED. 
Plaintiff shall pay Defendant $221,886 in attorney fees 
($217,442) and costs ($4,44J.63). 
Plaintiff's Objections to the Hansen, Brill, and Shur 
declarations are OVERRULED. 
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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
James Demetriades ("Plaintiff") commenced action against 
Yelp, Inc. ("Defendant"). Plaintiff's Complaint alleges causes 
of action for: (1) untrue or misleading advertising (Bus. & 
Prof. C. §§17500, et seq.); and (2) unfair business practices 
(Bus. & Prof. C. §§17200, et seq.) Plaintiff alleges that 
Defendant falsely represents the efficacy and ability of its 
system for filtering comments and reviews. 
Defendant responded with a Special Motion to Strike on July 
9, 2012. On September 7, 2012, Plaintiff filed a First Amended 
13 Complaint, and Defendant responded with a revised Special Motion 
14 to Strike. On January 25, 2013, Defendant's motion was heard 
15 and granted. Plaintiff is appealing the Court's order. 
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As a prevailing party, Yelp moved for a mandatory award of 
attorney's fees pursuant to CCP §425.16(c) (1); Ketchum v. Moses 
(2001) 24 Cal. 4th 1122. Yelp seeks an award of $230,590 in fees 
through February, 2013 and $3,675 in costs for work relating to 
its anti-SLAPP motion. Yelp also seeks fees and costs incurred 
with this fee motion, including $42,310 in fees through March, 
2013, that have not yet been billed, and additional fees that 
will be incurred in reply and argument on this motion. 
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the hours spent and 
hourly rates charged were excessive and the fees and costs 
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requested are unreasonable. Maughan v. Google Technology, Inc. 
(2006) 143 Cal.App.4 th 1242. 
In reply, Defendant argues that the fees are reasonable and 
well documented, including $230,590 (for fees and costs relating 
to the anti-SLAPP proceedings and excluding this motion) plus 
$64,339.63 for fees and costs incurred in connection with this 
motion, for a total of $294,929.63. 
II. 
DISCUSSION 
A. Applicable Law 
CCP §425.16(a) contains the Legislature's finding that 
there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought 
primarily to chill the valid exercise of free speech. 
Subsection (b) provides that a cause of action against a person 
arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the 
person's right of petition or free speech is subject to a 
special motion to strike unless the court determines that the 
plaintiff has established a probability of prevailing. 
Subsection (c) provides that a prevailing defendant on a special 
motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her 
attorney's fees and costs. Case law has held that the statute 
is to be broadly construed in order to effectuate its purpose of 
reimbursing prevailing defendants for expenses incurred in 
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1 extricating themselves from baseless lawsuit. Wilkerson v. 
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Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4 th 443, 446. 
Determining an appropriate fee award involves calculation 
of the lode star: number of hours reasonably spent multiplied 
by the reasonable hourly rate. PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler 
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(2000) 22 Cal. 4th 1084, 1095. The reasonable hourly rate is the 
prevailing rate in the community for similar work. Id. at 1095. 
In evaluating the legal services provided, courts are to take 
into consideration a number of factors including the nature of 
the litigation and its difficulty, the amount involved, the 
skill required and the skill employed, the attention given and 
the success or failure. Id. at 1096. 
14 B. Hourly Rates 
15 The reasonableness of the hourly rates charged by attorneys 
16 is measured by market rates in the community. Ketchum v. Moses 
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(2001) 24 Ca1.4th 1122, 1133. In opposition to this motion, 
Plaintiff offers the declaration of Michael Cassanego. While 
Mr. Cassanego's credentials are sufficient to demonstrate some 
expertise in the area, the opinion he offers regarding the 
reasonableness of the fees charged is not useful since he 
compared the rates billed to national rather than community 
rates. Objections to the Cassanego declaration are sustained to 
the extent he purports to opine on the reasonableness of the 
attorneys' hourly rates. The information provided by Defendant 
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on pages 14-15 of its motion regarding billing rates charged by 
attorneys with comparable experience in the Los Angeles area is 
useful and relevant. Much of this information is provided in 
the declaration of Ashlee Hansen, and objections to her 
declaration are therefore overruled. 
Ms. Laura Brill provided information regarding her 
education and experience that warrants the hourly fee of $660 
per hour that she charged in this matter. - Her declaration also 
provides sufficient information to support the hourly rates 
charged by Ahslee Hanson ($460), Nicholas Dunn ($535) and 
William Jacobsen ($310). 
13 Ms. Brill's declaration also seeks to provide support for 
14 the hourly rates charged by paralegals Patricia Perello and 
15 . However, there is nothing in the motion or 
16 declaration regarding the reasonable hourly rate charged by 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
paralegals in the Los Angeles area. Therefore, the Court 
reduces the hourly rate billed by Perello and  from $240 
to $150. 
Mr. Aaron Shur's declaration provides sufficient 
information regarding his education and training to support an 
hourly rate of $630. 
In sum, the Court finds that the hourly rate charged by 
each of Defendant's attorneys is reasonable. 
II 
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1 C. 
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Hours Worked 
Plaintiff argues that Defendant engaged in block billing, 
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making it difficult to tell how much time has been spent on 
various tasks. Plaintiff cites Bell v. Vista Unified School 
District (2000) 82 Cal.App.4 th 672, 689 for the rule that 
attorney billing statements that contain block billing may be 
disregarded in their entirety of reduced significantly. In 
Bell, the trial court awarded attorney's fees to the prevailing 
party without attempting to separate out hours spent on claims 
for which fees were recoverable and claims for which they were 
not. The appellate court noted that block billing made it 
13 nearly impossible to ascertain which hours could be attributed 
14 to the claim for which fees were recoverable, and instructed the 
15 trial court to use its discretion in assigning a reasonable 
16 percentage, or cast the billing statements aside. Plaintiff 
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also relies on Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 
Cal.App.4 th 1315, 1325, which warns against the danger of block 
billing because doing so could destroy an attorney's credibility 
if the court believes the billing statement is padded. 
Plaintiff's argument is not well taken under the 
circumstances. First, this is not a case where some claims 
provide for fees and others do not. Defendant's anti-SLAPP 
motion attacked the entire complaint and not just part of it. 
Second, Defendant has taken the time to excise entries that do 
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1 not relate to the anti-SLAPP motion or the discovery motion 
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related to it. Finally block billing is not per se 
objectionable, but is a discouraged practice because to the 
extent it renders a billing statement vague, it impedes the 
Court's ability to determine the reasonableness of the hours 
spent. Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 
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Cal.App.4 th 1315, 1325. The billing statement attached to the 
Brill declaration is exceptional in its organization and 
clarity. 
Plaintiff argues that because Ms. Brill is extremely 
experienced in the areas of anti-SLAPP, first amendment and 
technology, it should not have taken the firm 164 hours to 
14 research and draft an uncomplicated 15 page brief. Plaintiff 
15 cites Maughan v. Google Technology, Inc. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4 th 
16 1242 in support of this proposition. In Maughan, plaintiff 
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accounting corporation sued Google for libel, product liability 
and unfair business practice based on the allegation that a 
Google search produced results suggesting that the firm had been 
disciplined by the California Board of Accountancy. Google's 
anti-SLAPP motion was granted and it then filed a motion for 
fees in which it sought to recover $112,288.63. The trial court 
granted the motion for fees but only awarded $23,000. The trial 
court found that one 50-hour week of work was all that should 
have reasonably been spent on the motion, especially given the 
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litigation. The trial court specifically noted that it was 
having a hard time believing that counsel spent approximately 
four 50-hour work weeks on the motion. The trial court's order 
was appealed by Google and was affirmed on appeal. 
The Maughan case is on point and provides good support for 
Plaintiff's argument that the number of hours billed in this 
case is not reasonable. The Court has already found that the 
hourly rate charged by each of the attorneys is reasonable, and 
this was based in part on the exceptional qualifications they 
12 possess. Given that, it was not reasonable to spend so many 
13 hours of attorney time on the anti-SLAPP motion. Objections to 
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the Cassanego declaration as to the reasonableness of the hours 
spent are sustained; the Court has reached its own conclusion 
regarding the reasonableness of the hours spent. 
Ashlee Hansen 
Ms. Hansen spent the most time on this action. According 
to the Court's examination of the billing statements, it appears 
that she billed in excess of 200 hours in researching and 
preparing the briefs and documents for the motion. According to 
Defendant's motion for fees, Ms. Hansen spent approximately 285 
hours on the briefs and supporting materials. While the Court 
acknowledges that there was a certain amount of complexity of 
issues, and understands that a second motion was required after 
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amount of time. For Ms. Hansen's time from the time the 
Complaint was filed up through the date of the SLAPP motion 
hearing, the Court finds that 200 hours is reasonable. For Ms. 
Hansen's time since the hearing, she has billed over 95 hours. 
The Court finds that 75 is a reasonable number for the time 
required to draft this motion and reply. Therefore, 275 hours 
at $460/hour = $126,500. 
Laura Brill 
Ms. Brill acted as lead counsel for Defendant and 
supervised the work of Ms. Hansen. Ms. Brill billed for 104.6 
13 hours through February 28, 2013, and 28.6 since that time. The 
14 Court finds that 75 is a reasonable number of hours to have 
15 devoted to this action up to and including the hearing and 25 is 
16 a reasonable number of post-hearing hours. Therefore, 100 hours 
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at $660/hour $66,000. 
Nicholaus Daum 
The Court finds that the four hours billed by Mr. Daum are 
reasonable. Therefore, four hours at $535/hour = $2,140. 
William Jacobson 
The Court finds that the 9.2 hours billed by Mr. Jacobson 
are reasonable. Therefore, 9.2 hours at $310 = $2,852. 
II 
II 
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Aaron Schur 
The Court finds the 25 hours billed by Mr. Schur are 
reasonable. Therefore, 25 hours at $630/hour ~ $15,750. 
Patricia Perello 
The Court finds all 16.5 hours to be reasonable, but 
reduces the hourly rate to $150. Therefore, 16.5 hours at 
$150/hour ~ $2,475. 
 
The Court finds all 8.7 pre-hearing and the 2.8 post-
hearing hours to be reasonable, but reduces the hourly rate to 
$150. Therefore, 11.5 hours at $150/hour 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
$1,725. 
Based upon the foregoing, the court orders that: 
1) Defendant's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs is 
GRANTED. 
2) Plaintiff shall pay Defendant $221,886 in attorney fees 
($217,442) and costs ($4,444.63). 
3) Plaintiff's Objections to the Hansen, Brill, and Shur 
declarations are OVERRULED. 
CLERK TO GIVE NOTICE TO DEFENDANT. DEFENDANT TO GIVE 
NOTICE TO ALL OTHER PARTIES. 
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NON-COMPLIANCE WITH ANY ORDER HEREIN SHALL EXPOSE THE NON-
COMPLIANT PARTY AND/OR COUNSEL TO ANY SANCTIONS AUTHORIZED BY 
LAW. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: November 13, 2013 
COURT 
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